Position of Pre-Second Judges Transfer Case

 Position of Pre-Second Judges Transfer Case :

1. These writ petitions filed in different High Courts and transferred to this Court under Article 139* of the Constitution raise issues of great constitutional importance affecting the independence of the judiciary and they have been argued at great length before us. The arguments have occupied as many as thirty five days and they have ranged over a large number of issues comprising every imaginable aspect of the judicial institution, Voluminous written submissions have been filed before us which reflect the enormous industry and vast erudition of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and a large number of authorities, Indian as well as foreign, have been brought to our attention. 

We must acknowledge with gratitude our indebtedness to the learned Counsel for the great assistance they have rendered to us in the delicate and difficult task of adjudicating upon highly sensitive issues arising in these writ petitions. We find, and this is not unusual in cases of this kind, that a considerable amount of passion has been injected into the arguments on both sides and sometimes passion may appear to lend strength to an argument, but, sitting as Judges, we have to be careful to see that passion does not blind us to logic and predilections pervert proper interpretation of the constitutional provisions. We have to examine the arguments objectively and dispassionately without being swayed by populist approach or sentimental appeal. It is very easy for the human mind to find justification for a conclusion which accords with the dictates of emotion. Reason is a ready enough advocate for the decision one, consciously or unconsciously, desires to reach. 

We have therefore to rid our mind of any pre-conceived notions or ideas and interpret the Constitution as it is and not as we think it ought to be. We can always find some reason for bending the language of the Constitution to our will, if we want, but that would be rewriting the Constitution in the guise of interpretation. We must also remember that the Constitution is an organic instrument intended to endure and its provisions must be interpreted having regard to the constitutional objectives and goals and not in the light of how a particular Government may be acting at a given point of time. Judicial response to the problem of constitutional interpretation must not suffer from the fault of emotionalism or sentimentalism which is likely to cloud the vision when Judges are confronted with issues of momentous importance. 

In the first place in the very nature of things it is difficult to accept the submission that all the three consulting functionaries under Article 217(1)[1] must be regarded as of co-ordinate authority for the simple reasons that on aspects like capacity, character, merit, efficiency and fitness which converge on the suitability of the person proposed for appointment the Governor of the State will be least informed and will have nothing to say whereas the Thief Justice of the High Court and Chief Justice of India, being best informed, are well equipped to express their views and tender advice; further it is an accepted position which has been alluded to by the Law Commission in its 14th Report, that it is because of the financial aspect (salary and emoluments of a High Court Judge being charged on the Consolidated Fund of the State) and information about the antecedents, local affiliations and like other matters, capable of objective proof, concerning the proposed appointee which the State Executive would be possessing, that consultation with the Governor has been provided for.

 It is, therefore, difficult to regard the Governor of the State as being of co-ordinate authority with the other two consulting functionaries especially on the aspect of suitability which is the primary thing in the matter of making appointment of High Court Judges. Secondly, in my view, Mr. Pocker Saheb's rejected amendment has nothing to do with the primacy question at all because it was concerned with the effort at complete exclusion of the executive interference in the matter of appointment of the High Court Judges. If the amendment had been accepted the result would have been that the appointment shall have been made with the initiation of the proposal by the Chief Justice of the High Court, the consultation with the State Executive being retained because of the financial aspect and information regarding antecedents, etc. and only upon the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India, which, in other

words, means the Chief Justice of India would have had the power to veto any proposal. In my view, conferring a power of veto on the Chief Justice of India is entirely different from the primacy being given to his views or advice over and above the views or advice of the other consulting functionaries, as a limiting factor on the President's discretion. The rejection of the amendment, therefore, has no bearing whatsoever on the question of primacy with which the Court is concerned at the moment Thirdly, once it is realised that the scope and ambit of full and effective consultation requires that all the material facts and records concerning the proposed candidate must be made available to both these consulting functionaries by placing the same before each during the consultative process and that each consulting functionary must consider the same or identical material and exchange each one's views thereon with the other there is no merit left in the argument that the Chief Justice of the High Court has a closer opportunity to assess the suitability of the proposed appointee; surely it is not a case of watching the demeanour of a witness so as to put the assessment of the Chief Justice of the High Court on any higher footing.

 Having regard to these aspects, particularly the last one, one will have to consider whether any primacy could be and should be given to the views and advice tendered by the Chief Justice of India to the President in the matter of appointing High Court Judges. I must confess that the Article does not expressly suggest that any primacy is to be accorded to his advice during the consultative process undertaken in Article 217(1) but, in my view, the scheme of consultative process contemplated by that Article envisages consideration of identical facts and materials bearing on the suitability of the candidate by both the consulting functionaries, namely, the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India, as also an exchange of their views on such material, and thereafter placing of the entire material together with each one's views thereon and the tendering of the advice or final recommendation by the Chief Justice of India to the President whose decision should be guided by such advice or final recommendation so tendered.

 Where the duty sought to his (SIC)-forced is imposed on a public official or a public body for the benefit of a specific class of persons, persons within the class are competent to apply for mandrel (SIC) mug without further ado, Per eons out the class may have locus stoned they have a special interest in its performance i.e. an interest over and above that of the general public. These cases have made us think about ourselves and our learned brothers in the superior judiciary of the country. We are made to realise that we are all mortals with all the human frailties and that only a few know in this world the truth behind the following statement of Michel De Montaigne: "Were I not to follow the straight road for its straightness, I should follow it for having found by experience that in the end it is commonly the happiest and the most useful track". It is true that the Judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court hold their tenure not at the pleasure of the President but till they attain the prescribed age of retirement; that their removal is possible only after following an elaborate procedure: that their salaries and allowances and pension are charged on the consolidated funds of the States or of the Union; that no discussion can take place in the legislatures with respect to their conduct in the discharge of their duties except on a motion for their removal; that they have the power to punish a person for contempt of court and they are protected by a host of other provisions of law which are intended to make them feel and to remain independent of any external agency such as the executive. These, as far as they go, are necessary for ensuring the independence of the judiciary. But if the judiciary should be really independent something more is necessary and that we have to seek in the Judge himself and not outside, 

A Judge should be independent of himself. A Judge is a human being who is a bundle of passions and prejudices, likes and dislikes affection and ill-will, hatred and contempt and fear and recklessness. In order to be a successful Judge these elements should be curbed and kept under restraint and that is possible only by education, training, continued practice and cultivation of a sense of humility and dedication to duty. These curbs can neither be bought in the market nor Injected into human system by the written or unwritten laws. If these things are there even if any of the protective measures provided by the Constitution and the laws go the independence of the judiciary will not suffer. But with all these measures being there still a Judge may not be independent. It is the inner strength of Judges alone that can save the judiciary.


[1] Article 217 (1) – Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court.

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